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Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy
Brian Bix
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 221 pp.
Reviewed by Russell Jacksont

As the preeminent means by which we bring concepts such as law
into the material world, language can be the first thing seized upon
to explain why interpretations of law may vary from person to person. In a densely-packed, yet subtle book, comprehensively entitled
Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy, University of London lecturer Brian Bix warns legal theorists of all levels that although language may represent the sole method of presenting law, that does
not mean that language is the sole, or even the most important, factor in understanding it.
Bix addresses the complex theme of legal determinacy, and
language's role in it, against a backdrop of Wittgenstein's language
philosophies. Taking three representative approaches to the law,
H. L.A. Hart's idea of open texture, Ronald Dworkin's interpretive
theory, and Michael Moore's metaphysical realism, Bix methodically assesses how each accounts for the derivation of meaning from
language-comprised law.
First establishing a linguistic basis from which to proceed, Bix
then analyzes Hart's open texture theory, both on its own terms and
in relation to earlier and more fundamental theories of the same
name propounded by Wittgenstein and his interpreter Friedrich
Waismann. Hart claims that any rule encompasses a "fringe of
vagueness" outside of its obvious application: does a ban on vehicles
in a park include roller skates, for example?
Bix believes that this theory essentially forms an empirical
rationale for judicial discretion. Bix feels that this does justice to
Hart's version of open texture because it helps to identify the
limitation of language when it comes to constructing exhaustive
rules. But just as importantly, Bix reigns in Hart's theory to prevent
the potential confusion between what Hart meant by open texture,
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and what Waismann and Wittgenstein referred to when they used the
same phrase.
The possibility for confusion is increased by the shared use of
the term "foreseeability." But while Hart examines a rule's interpretation of an event that the rule did not foresee and that falls on the
edge of its obvious reference, Waismann and Wittgenstein entertained a more extreme experiment. They contemplated the effect
that an unforeseeable shift in referential reality itself would have on
the efficacy of conversational language.
It is clear, therefore, that Hart's and Wittgenstein's nominally
identical theories actually investigate significantly different notions
of language (rule vs. commonplace speech, respectively), as well as
significantly different types of unforeseeable effects that could
strain the meaning of language. Hart's use of the terms to study
problems of questionable applicability represents a far narrower result than the limits of semantic intelligibility that concerned
Wittgenstein. Bix sets out for the reader Hart's specific contribution
and Wittgenstein's more fundamental language theories. Bix thus
provides a creditable standard by which to measure the often
grandiose claims for language of Hart, Dworkin, and Moore. In
fact, Bix contends that legal theorists tend to "find more in
Wittgenstein than is actually there." 1 Particularly, and not surprisingly, this applies to Wittgenstein's rule-following theories, which,
as the name portends, would hold special appeal for legal scholars.
Contrary to the language-definitive theories of Hart, Dworkin,
and Moore, however, Wittgenstein did not postulate that language
contains any inherent compulsive power. Rather, Bix contends, he
went precisely the opposite way, downplaying the significance of
language's unique nature in any conclusion about how rules are understood and followed. Instead, Wittgenstein tied the issue of language's compulsive power in with his views on the general nature of
language. He realized that meaning depends on the "determinacy of
the descriptive term"; 2 which is the collective force with which a
society imbues that term. This, in turn, is a culmination of many
factors, and Wittgenstein maintained that a "consensus in applying
such terms is due to some combination of our common human na-

1 B. Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) at
61-62.
2 Supra note 1 at 62.
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ture, our common training and our common way of life."3
Wittgenstein's seminal philosophy reasonably steps back from labelling any single factor, including language, the determinative influence on meaning. Bix juxtaposes this position against the legal
theories that inflate language's role, suggesting that such theorists
have pursued language with more exuberance than insight.
If anything, this identifies a central weakness of the book, in that
this underlying thesis is not identified at the beginning. If Bix had
clearly stated at the outset that he intended to demonstrate that
legal theorists have approached language with a misguided
methodology, he would have given substance to what initially seems
an unsatisfying effort, for Bix consistently reveals the inadequacy of
successive language-oriented theories, but confirms nothing in their
stead. As Bix's arguments unfold, an implicit theme that legal
theorists have made too much of language's role in legal
determinacy becomes apparent. His point is valid and timely, but
it could have been made much more strongly if explicitly
identified in the introduction.
From Hart, who fixes meaning on the words used, Bix moves to
analyze Dworkin's interpretive doctrine, which places the onus of
discovering legal meaning on the judges who interpret those words.
Dworkin contends that all legal conflicts contain their own proper
solution which must be divined by the arbitrator. Bix criticizes
Dworkin' s main contention in illuminating ways. For example, he
corrects Dworkin' s inversion of the cause and effect properties of
language using Darwinian evolutionary arguments.
Bix refutes Dworkin's theory point-by-point, but discusses
Moore's metaphysical realism more broadly. While Hart proposed
that rules could be inherently peremptory, and Dworkin stressed a
judge's responsibility to discern the true implication of the law's
language, Moore questioned the very connection between language
and concept that makes language relevant at all.
Metaphysical realism posits that legal concepts occupy a kind
of quasi-Platonic position of permanence that the words of a law can
only approximate. This represents a rudimentary linguistic truism
regarding semantic flexibility and, while it bears keeping in mind,
Bix says that it is not something on which to base a whole theory of
legal determinacy. More significantly, Bix sees in metaphysical
realism the same failing he sees in Hart's and Dworkin' s theories.
3
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They extrapolate into an entire theory about understanding law
merely one aspect of the whole, much more complex, process.
The connection between law and language is indisputable, Hart,
Dworkin, and Moore are seduced by this fact and each attempt to
build, with this idea as its starting point, a comprehensive theory of
how we derive meaning from law. Bix assesses each of these theories
in turn and demonstrates how they fundamentally overstate the role
of language in law.
Squeezing into two hundred concise pages a comparative study
of three major legal theories, selections from a language philosophy
and a host of subordinate doctrines, Bix assumes in the reader a
substantial working knowledge of the theories critiqued. While his
analysis is incisive and succinct, it makes the book a tough first venture into jurisprudence.

